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Proponents of judicial activism often find themselves walking a 
difficult, uncertain line regarding the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution. On one hand, most contemporary judicial activists 
are disdainful of attempts to tie constitutional interpretation to the 
specific intentions of the drafters.• On the other, they are uneasy 
about totally divorcing themselves from the drafters' understand-
ing, perhaps cognizant of the effect that such a course would have 
on the plausibility of their theories. 
One popular resolution of this dilemma has been to associate 
judicial activism with general concepts that activists see embodied 
in the Constitution.z "Equality" is the concept that is perhaps most 
often mentioned. While conceding that the drafters of the four-
teenth amendment were primarily concerned with racial discrimi-
nation, activists argue that courts may appropriately extrapolate 
from this concern a broad, open-ended theory of equality that can 
be implemented through protection of a wide variety of groups. 
Thus, for example, Laurence H. Tribe argues that the constitution-
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I. See, e.g., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373, 378 (1982)(originalism 
is "increasingly without defenders, at least in the academic legal community.") 
2. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133-37 (1977) (constitutional 
provisions define general concepts rather than specific conceptions); Sedler, The Legitimacy 
Debate in Constitutional Adjudication, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 110, 122 (1983) ("(m]any of the 
limitations on governmental power designed to protect individual rights that are contained in 
the Constitution are broadly phrased and open ended, and these majestic generalities directed 
toward the protection of individual rights are a part of our constitutional tradition"). See 
generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (deriving "representation-reinforce-
ment" theory of constitutional adjudication from perceived preference for democracy in 
Constitution). 
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alization of a general principle of "antisubjugation" is "faithful to 
the historical origins of the Civil War Amendments,"3 while 
Michael John Perry contends that a general focus on the "moral 
relevance" of classifications is simply an "elaboration" of the fram-
ers' specific intentions.4 
Such arguments rest on two related premises. The first is that 
the framers' expressed concern with racial discrimination was sim-
ply intended to be a paradigm for a more generally applicable the-
ory of equality. The second is that this paradigm was group-
based-that is, that the framers' primary concern was that groups 
possessing particular characteristics not be discriminated against by 
governments 
The difficulty with such arguments is that they rely on a one-
sided appraisal of the framers' world view. The desire to protect 
blacks from unjust discrimination was certainly one aspect of that 
world view, but so was a conviction that the states should be left 
free to make certain other types of classifications. If one wishes to 
extrapolate to general principles, both sides of the equation must be 
taken into account. 
This article will explore this point by focusing on discrimina-
tion on the bases of alienage and sex. These issues were chosen for 
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has scrutinized both types of 
classification closely in recent years. Second, the historical record 
contains substantial evidence of the framers' views on the propriety 
of discrimination on the basis of alienage and sex. 
This article will briefly describe the Supreme Court's present 
approach to alienage and sex discrimination, followed by a sum-
mary of the commentators' response to the Supreme Court's ap-
proach. The article will then address the historical record, arguing 
that the framers accepted classifications based upon sex and alien-
3. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515-16 (2d ed. 1988). 
4. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 CoL L. 
REv. 1024, 1065-67 (1979). 
5. Group-based theories should be distinguished from a general distaste for "class leg-
islation"-laws that deprive any small group of vested rights. At the time the fourteenth 
amendment was adopted, such legislation was considered inconsistent with the concept of 
due process of law. See, e.g., The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 581-82 (1819) (argument of Daniel Webster); Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 
(1851); James V. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 250, 251-52 (1851); T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REsT UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351-59 (1st ed. 1867); R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: 
A HISfORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOL-
LOWED BY THE CoURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CoNCEPT OF THE "LAW OF THE 
LAND" 259-74 (1926). The drafters of the fourteenth amendment clearly believed that they 
were outlawing class legislation. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
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age. The article will conclude by discussing the relevance of these 
findings for equal protection theory generally. 
I 
In the post-Warren era, the Court has developed an unusually 
complex doctrinal structure for addressing constitutional challenges 
to laws that differentiate between aliens and citizens. Graham v. 
Richardson 6 established the general rule that strict scrutiny would 
apply to discrimination against lawfully-admitted aliens by state 
governments. Subsequently, Sugarman v. Dougall recognized an 
exception to this rule, adopting the rational basis test to evaluate 
laws excluding aliens from voting; holding elective office or impor-
tant nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions; or be-
coming officers who participate directly in the formulation, 
execution, or review of broad public policy.' The Court has relied 
upon the Sugarman exception to reject challenges to state laws for-
bidding aliens to serve as policemen,s teachers,9 and probation of-
ficers.w The basic principle established in Graham remains intact, 
however.11 
Discrimination against lawfully admitted aliens by the federal 
government presents an even more complicated picture. Where the 
challenged statute deals solely with an insular possession or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Graham/Sugarman principles apply.12 By 
contrast, nationwide discrimination initiated by Congress or the 
President is subject only to the rational basis test.I3 Finally, nation-
wide discrimination by an administrative agency will face an inter-
mediate standard of review ,14 
Discrimination against aliens who are not lawfully admitted 
presents different problems. The Court has not established a gen-
eral principle that discrimination against this class is subject to 
heightened scrutiny. Nonetheless, in Plyler v. Doe,1s the majority 
applied intermediate level scrutiny to strike down a Texas statute 
that denied a free public education to aliens who had not been law-
fully admitted. 
6. 403 u.s. 365 (1971). 
7. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647-48 (1973). 
8. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
9. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
10. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). 
II. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). 
12. Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 
572 (1976). 
13. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
14. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
15. 457 U.S. 202 (1981). 
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The formal standard of review for cases involving sex discrimi-
nation is more easily described. After some initial disarray, in Craig 
v. Boren t6 a majority held that such discrimination was unconstitu-
tional unless substantially related to an important governmental in-
terest. This substantial relationship test continues to govern the 
Court's treatment of sex discrimination issues. In practice, the ap-
plication of that standard has invariably led the Court to strike 
down laws that a majority of the Justices view as discriminating 
against women. By contrast, the Court has been unwilling to 
closely scrutinize discrimination on the basis of pregnancyt7 or clas-
sifications that have only the effect of placing women at a disadvan-
tage.ts Further, the pattern of decisions on statutes that facially 
disadvantage men defies easy characterization. Since Boren, the 
Court has invalidated statutes that imposed alimony obligations on 
husbands but not wives;t9 that allowed natural mothers of illegiti-
mate children to veto adoption but denied that right to the fathers 
of those children;2o and that denied males entrance to a nurse-train-
ing program.21 At the same time, however, the Court has left 
standing some statutes that differentiate between the rights of natu-
ral mothers and fathers;22 a statutory rape law that punished only 
males;23 and a federal statute that exempted women from register-
ing from the draft.24 In any event, it is clear that the modem Court 
has attacked sex discrimination far more actively than in earlier 
eras. 
Commentators generally support the application of searching 
judicial scrutiny to most alienage-based classifications.2s They often 
see the application of strict scrutiny as a logical extrapolation of the 
16. 429 u.s. 190 (1976). 
17. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
18. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
19. Orr v. Orr, 440 u.s. 268 (1979). 
20. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
21. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
22. Rg., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 
(1979). 
23. Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
24. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
For differing views on the nature of the dynamic that created this pattern of decisions, 
compare Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Coun in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. 
REv. 357, 374-97 (1982) (arguing pattern reflects interaction between different doctrinal ap-
proaches of various Justices) with Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Constitu-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (arguing that pattern reflects oscillation between two different 
theories about the nature of sex differences, both of which are fundamentally flawed). 
25. Rg., J. ELY, supra note 2, at 161-62; E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE 
CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 29-53 (1985); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1552-53; 
Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Founeenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. I, 
44, 46 (1977); Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote? 75 MICH. 
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framers' general theory of equality. For example, Kenneth Karst 
L. REv. 1092 (1977); Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens/rom Discriminatory Treatment by the 
Federal Government, 1977 SuP. Cr. REv. 275. 
Many commentators are uncomfortable with the implications of the Court's equal pro-
tection analysis. They prefer to rely on the structuraVsupremacy clause argument that was 
the basis of Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) and an alternative analysis in Graham, supra 
note 6. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1550-51 n. 57; Perry, supra note 3, at 1059-1060. 
Even if accepted as a sound basis for the analysis of discrimination against aliens, a 
supremacy based approach could not explain all of the results reached by the Court in the 
alienage cases. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), is the clearest example. 
There the Court struck down a federal Civil Service Commission regulation that barred aliens 
from the competitive service. Since in that case the challenged discrimination was mandated 
by a federal agency, the result obviously cannot be justified by reference to the need to main-
tain the supremacy of the federal government over state authorities. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981), fares no better under a supremacy clause analysis. In 
that case the plaintiffs-illegally present in the United States-had in essence forced them-
selves not only on a reluctant state government, but also an unwilling federal government. 
While perhaps not to be treated as outlaws, entirely outside the protection of government 
authority, their claim to that protection is minimal at best. Certainly it seems anomalous to 
infer that the federal interest in the plaintiffs' welfare extends to interference with traditional 
state authority to distribute educational resources when by law the primary federal goal is to 
remove them not only from the state, but also from the territorial limits of federal power 
altogether. 
A focus on the structuraVsupremacy clause approach could, however, explain some of 
the more puzzling aspects in the equal protection analysis of alienage classifications. First, 
supremacy-based analysis justifies a difference in the standard of review for state and federal 
classifications, respectively. Obviously, if the true source of suspicion of alienage classifica-
tions is the need to maintain the supremacy of the federal government, classifications by state 
governments should be subject to greater scrutiny than their federal counterparts. 
The failure to impose strict scrutiny on exclusions of aliens from suffrage and policy-
making positions also fits comfortably into supremacy-based analysis. Preventing the states 
from interfering with the delegated powers of the federal government is an important value in 
the constitutional scheme; at the same time, however, maintaining the status of the states as 
quasi-sovereign entities is also an important structural value of the same system. While deter-
mining the manner in which government benefits such as welfare are distributed is an intru-
sion on that status, dictating the structure of state government is a much greater intrusion. 
Indeed, the power to determine the structure of government is the very essence of sovereign 
authority. Thus a structural argument might well infer a federal intention to force states to 
provide aliens with equal access to government benefits, but not to the governing process 
itself. 
The major difficulty is that the premises of the supremacy clause justification for en-
hanced scrutiny are fatally flawed. Any analysis must begin by recognizing that federal limits 
on the authority of the states to determine the distribution of benefits within the territory 
under their control are the exception rather than the rule; in general, the constitutional 
scheme presumes that the local governments are free to determine who are to receive those 
benefits. This presumption can only be overcome by the presence of some overriding federal 
interest. 
On its face, the simple decision to grant an alien admission to the Untied States does not 
embody such an interest. The impact of such a decision is primarily negative; it simply pro-
vides that (unlike aliens who are not lawfully admitted), the legally admitted alien is not 
subject to deportation. If a special federal interest in the welfare of aliens exists, its sources 
must be found elsewhere. 
Admittedly, in certain limited circumstances, federal statutes do reflect such an interest. 
For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1870}--the codification of the 1870 anti-discrimination act-
guarantees to aliens the ability to enjoy a set of specified rights. Some commentators have 
suggested that sec. 1982 is simply an example of a general federal policy that aliens and 
citizens should be accorded equal treatment. The overall pattern of federal action, however, 
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sees the amendment as embodying a general principle of "equal citi-
zenship" that is broad enough to be applied appropriately to 
aliens.26 Elizabeth Hull reaches an even stronger conclusion by dif-
ferent reasoning. She contends that the concept of citizenship "was 
[not] granted more than a minimal and vague role in [the fourteenth 
amendment.)"27 Thus, she concludes, even the Sugarman excep-
tion "vests citizenship with a significance that is at variance with 
the language and history of the Constitution. "zs 
Academic commentary on the Court's sex discrimination juris-
prudence is if anything even more emphatic. Although the Burger 
Court was more hostile to sex discrimination than any Supreme 
Court in history, most commentators argue that the Court should 
be even more activist. These commentators make one or more of a 
number of different claims: that the Justices have been insufficiently 
hostile to laws that (on their face at least) discriminate against 
men;29 that the Court should not concentrate solely on discrimina-
tory intent, but instead should closely scrutinize all laws having dis-
parate impacts;Jo and that the Court's refusal to treat 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as sex discrimination is 
indefensible.3t Like the commentators on the alienage cases, a 
number of those taking this position seek to tie their argument to 
clearly reflects the view that the distinction between alienage and citizenship can appropri· 
ately be taken into consideration in a variety of contexts. 
The reaction of the executive branch to the Hampton decision provides a particularly 
striking example. The majority opinion in Hampton clearly suggested that action by Con-
gress or the President explicitly barring aliens from the Civil Service might well survive con-
stitutional scrutiny. President Ford acted quickly to accept the implicit invitation, issuing an 
Executive Order that in essence reinstated the regulation that the Court had found constitu-
tionally infirm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an at-
tack on the Executive Order, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Vegara v. Hampton, 
581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979). As Mathews demonstrates, 
the federal government denies other benefits to aliens as well. 
Of course, in certain circumstances it does guarantee specified rights to all or some 
aliens; the Civil Rights Act of 1870 is a prime example. The point is that there is no general 
federal policy in favor of granting the same benefits to aliens that citizens receive. Thus the 
most logical solution is to retreat to the normal presumption-in the absence of some specific 
federal pronouncement, states should be free to distinguish between aliens and citizens in the 
distribution of benefits, just as they are generally .free to distinguish between different classes 
of citizens. The only plausible reason for departing from the analysis is based on some sort of 
equal protection analysis. 
26. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 44-46 (1977). 
27. E. HULL, supra note 25, at 45. 
28. /d. at 46. 
29. See, e.g., Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 
HAST. L.J. 979 (1980). 
30. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 24. 
31. See, e.g., Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 
and n.207 (1984), and sources cited therein. 
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the framers' general intention in adopting section one of the four-
teenth amendment. For example, Judith A. Baer argues that the 
dominant Republicans intended to constitutionalize a "lavish grant 
of liberty and equality" in the fourteenth amendment-a grant 
which she claims has since been under-enforced through lack of ju-
dicial and congressional action.J2 Similarly, Karst again relies on 
the sweeping concept of equal citizenship.JJ Both Baer and Karst 
rely on the general principle of equality to justify more extensive 
judicial intervention against laws that discriminate on the basis of 
sex.J4 
As the remainder of this article will demonstrate, an examina-
tion of the historical record reveals a very different picture. 
Whatever principles the framers intended to incorporate into the 
fourteenth amendment were simply not broad enough to justify gen-
eral prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of either alienage or 
sex. I will first consider the historical record relating to alienage, 
and then turn to sex discrimination. 
II 
Hull is demonstrably incorrect when she suggests that citizen-
ship was essentially an irrelevancy to the drafters of the equal pro-
tection clause. The idea of national citizenship was in fact central 
to the political theory that shaped the fourteenth amendment. 
The concept of citizenship figured prominently in the sectional 
dispute that ultimately culminated in the Civil War. Arguments 
over citizenship arose in two contexts. One set of questions dealt 
with the status of free blacks. Other, more general citizenship-re-
lated issues were even more central to the controversy that gener-
ated the war. 
For free blacks, the question of citizenship was critical in a 
number of different areas. Two of the most prominent involved the 
Negro Seamen's Acts, which severely limited the freedom of black 
seamen in some southern ports, and prohibitions on black immigra-
tion into a number of free as well as slave states. Free blacks and 
their advocates argued that these discriminatory enactments vio-
lated the privileges and immunities clause of article IV -the comity 
clause-which limits the right of states to discriminate against so-
32. J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 105 (1983). 
33. Karst, supra note 26, at 44. 
34. See J. BAER, supra note 32, at 121-26, 143-49; Karst, supra note 26, at 53-55; Karst, 
Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447. 
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joumers from other states.35 The difficulty is that the comity clause 
protects only citizens. Thus, unless blacks could claim that status, 
the comity clause was of no use to them. 
The pro-slavery position on this point was clear-free blacks 
were not citizens of the United States, and thus were not protected 
by the comity clause. Therefore, the Negro Seamen's Acts and ex-
clusionary enactments were entirely consistent with the Constitu-
tion. This position was ultimately adopted in Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.36 
In the antebellum era, Republican opinion was more divided 
on this point. Some maintained that all free blacks were citizens of 
the United States.37 Other Republicans, fearful of Democratic 
charges that they favored "racial equality," adopted more moderate 
positions on the issue. For example, in the Lincoln-Douglas debates 
Abraham Lincoln faulted Dred Scott only because it deprived the 
states of the authority to define citizenship. At the same time, how-
ever, Lincoln stated that his personal view was that blacks should 
not be considered citizens.Js 
As the Civil War progressed, the Republican position on the 
citizenship issue hardened. In 1864, Edward Bates, Lincoln's At-
torney General, issued an official opinion which concluded that free 
blacks were in fact citizens of the United States.39 By the end of the 
war, all but the most conservative Republicans adhered to this posi-
tion. At the same time, Democrats continued to charge that this 
view reflected the Republican belief in total racial equality. 
The concept of citizenship was also central to the debate over 
state sovereignty, the political theory underlying the secessionist po-
sition. 40 Advocates for state sovereignty argued that state citizen-
ship was primary and national citizenship only derivative 
35. See, e.g., J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT Of AMERICAN CITizENSHIP, 1608-
1870 ch. 10 (1978); Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 
A.J.L.H. 305, 339-42 (1988). 
36. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1857). For excellent discussions of Dred Scott and its after-
math, see FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND PoLmCS passim (1978); P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
CoMITY AND FEDERALISM chs. 8-10 (1981). 
37. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1859) (remarks of Rep. 
Bingham). 
38. THE LINCOLN-DoUGLAS DEBATES Of 1858 at 51 (R. Johannsen ed. 1965). 
39. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1864). 
40. Contemporary discussions of the theory of state sovereignty include State v. Hunt, 9 
S.C. 1, 1-210 (1834), and John C. Calhoun's famous Fort Hill address, reprinted in 11 THE 
PAPERS Of JOHN C. CALHOUN 413-440 (C. Wilson & E. Hemphill eds. 1978). For more 
modem analysis, see W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR ch. 5 (1966), and Bestor, 
State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Pros/avery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-
1860, 54 J. ILL. STATE HIST. Soc'y 148 (1961). 
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therefrom; the Union position, by contrast, rested on the view that 
citizens' allegiance to the national government was paramount.41 
The Union victory in the Civil War firmly established the pre-
eminence of national citizenship. This development did not de-
stroy the concept of states' rights as an important element in 
American political ideology. It did, however, lead to a new empha-
sis on the reciprocal obligations between citizens and the federal 
government. Given the prominence of the citizenship question in 
the disputes that underlay the Civil War, it is not surprising that the 
issue should reemerge strongly in the debates over Reconstruction. 
The idea of national citizenship figured prominently in the discus-
sions of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and section one of the 
fourteenth amendment itself. 
As initially proposed by Lyman Trumbull on January 5, 1866, 
section one of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 did not deal with citizen-
ship at all. Instead, the Bill provided that: 
There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants 
of any state or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to 
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same 
right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties and to give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none 
other .... 42 
Congressional power to pass the proposal in this form could 
only be found in the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amend-
ment. Reliance on this constitutional provision posed substantial 
problems. First, one had to conclude that the thirteenth amend-
ment went beyond mere dissolution of the master/slave relationship 
and granted Congress the authority to protect rights inherent in the 
status of freedman. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion 
that this position was consistent with the intent of the drafters of 
the thirteenth amendment;43 nonetheless, from the language of the 
amendment, the grant of such power is far from clear. 
Moreover, even if the thirteenth amendment vested power in 
Congress to protect certain rights, the Civil Rights Bill might have 
been considered to go too far. Some Republicans believed that the 
section two authority extended only to those rights which were es-
sential to the status of a freedman. Put another way, if one could be 
41. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the 
Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221, 232 (1986). 
42. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
43. See Maltz, supra note 41, at 238-48. 
260 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:251 
a freedman without a particular right, then Congress could not rely 
on thirteenth amendment authority to protect that right. Although 
aliens, for example, were clearly not slaves, they had historically 
been limited in their right to own real property and to inherit intes-
tate. Thus, one could be deprived of those rights and yet not have 
the status of a slave.44 Nonetheless, both rights were protected by 
Trumbull's proposal. 
To address this problem, even before the Bill was debated in 
the full Senate, Trumbull moved an amendment to provide that "all 
persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby de-
clared to be citizens of the United States." Trumbull argued that 
the naturalization clause as well as the thirteenth amendment gave 
Congress authority to confer citizenship on free blacks. He further 
contended that the power to create citizens necessarily implied a 
power to protect the inherent rights of citizenship. These rights he 
defined by reference to judicial decisions interpreting the comity 
clause. 4s Other prominent Republicans argued that the comity 
clause itself conferred authority on Congress to protect the "privi-
leges and immunities" of all citizens. 46 Thus the relationship be-
tween the citizens of the United States and the federal government 
became the anchor to which the Civil Rights Bill was attached. 
Democrats attacked the citizenship provision, contending that 
blacks should not be made citizens and that, in any event, Dred · 
Scott could only be overruled by a constitutional amendment.47 
Republicans generally rejected these arguments. At the same time, 
however, they showed considerable concern about the proper limi-
tations on "the inestimable privilege" of American citizenship4s and 
the rights appurtenant to that status. 
The status of American Indians became a matter of particu-
larly intense debate. James H. Lane of Kansas wished to have 
Indians who had taken allotments of land within their home state to 
be declared citizens of the United States.49 While some Republi-
cans such as John B. Henderson of Missouri were willing to go even 
further and confer citizenship on all Indians,so others preferred the 
grant to be more limited. George H. Williams of Oregon, for exam-
ple, feared that declaring Indians to be citizens would automatically 
44. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. App. 158 (1866). 
45. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 499-500, 600 (1866). 
46. See, e.g., id. at 1117-18 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id at 1835-37 (remarks of Rep. 
Lawrence). 
47. E.g., id. at 500 (remarks of Sen. Johnson); id. at 1120 (remarks of Rep. Rogers). 
48. /d. at 527 (remarks of Sen. Ramsey). 
49. /d. at 506. 
50. /d. at 573. 
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invalidate a variety of restrictive laws.s1 Ultimately a compromise 
was reached; the Senate adopted language providing that "all per-
sons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States."s2 
One more citizenship-related change was necessary before pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Bill. Even after the addition of the citizen-
ship clause, the Bill prohibited discrimination between the 
"inhabitants" of the states with respect to designated rights. In the 
Senate debate, Democrat Reverdy Johnson of Maryland com-
plained that this language would prohibit states from discriminating 
against aliens with respect to property ownership.s3 The House Ju-
diciary Committee addressed the problem by changing the language 
from "[t]here shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants of 
the United States ... "to "[t]here shall be no discrimination among 
the citizens of the United States." As explained by James F. Wilson, 
floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill and chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, the amendment was adopted to obviate the 
possibility that the protections of the proposed Civil Rights Act 
would be extended to aliens.s4 Thus the dominant Republicans 
clearly understood that aliens might appropriately be granted fewer 
rights than citizens. 
Citizenship-related issues also played a prominent role in the 
discussions of the fourteenth amendment. The definition of citizen-
ship was the only part of section one that engendered extensive de-
bate. Senate Democrats and their allies raised the same concern 
over the status of Indians that had generated so much consternation 
during the drafting of the Civil Rights Act.ss Bound by the disci-
pline imposed in the party caucus, however, Senate Republicans 
easily rebuffed efforts to change the language.s6 
The centrality of the idea of citizenship to the Republican con-
cept of rights is demonstrated even more clearly by the remainder of 
section one. After the criteria for citizenship are defined, states are 
prohibited from denying the "privileges and immunities" of citizen-
ship to citizens of the United States. All persons are then guaran-
teed equal protection and due process. The logical implication is 
that citizens are guaranteed a broader class of rights than other 
residents. 
51. /d. 
52. /d. 
53. /d. at 505. 
54. /d. at 1115. 
55. See id. at 2890-97. 
56. /d. at 2897. 
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Raoul Berger suggests that the difference in phraseology was 
inadvertent.s7 The presentation of Senator Jacob Howard of Michi-
gan-floor manager of the fourteenth amendment-belies this 
claim. Howard begins with a discussion of the privileges and im-
munities clause which he explicitly notes "relates to ... citizens of 
the United States as such, and as distinguished from all other per-
sons not citizens of the United States."ss His presentation proceeds 
with a detailed analysis of the question of who in fact is a citizen, 
followed by an extended discourse on the content of the "great mass 
of privileges and immunities" that are to be guaranteed by the 
clause.s9 Only then does Howard discuss the due process and equal 
protection clauses. These clauses, Howard notes, apply "not merely 
[to] a citizen of the United States, but to any person."60 He dis-
misses the rights guaranteed to non-citizens in a single paragraph, 
focusing primarily on the problem of unequal criminal laws. The 
implication is clear: Republicans viewed citizens as entitled to sub-
stantially more rights than noncitizens.6t 
The concept of citizenship came once more into focus in 1869 
during the Senate consideration of the proposed fifteenth amend-
ment. In the Senate, one of the most hotly-debated issues was the 
question of whether all racial groups should be guaranteed the right 
to vote. A number of proposals were offered which would have had 
the effect of excluding resident Chinese from the protection of the 
proposed constitutional amendment. Jacob Howard of Michigan, 
for example, would have changed the proposed amendment to pro-
vide that "[c]itizens of the United States of African descent shall 
have the same right to vote and hold office ... as other citi-
zens. . . . "62 George Williams of Oregon took a slightly different 
tack; he would have limited the protections of the proposed amend-
ment to native-born citizens.63 Since the Chinese were immigrants, 
states would have been left free to exclude them from voting. 
All of these proposals were defeated, largely because many 
Republicans were unwilling to allow any racial discrimination be-
tween citizens with respect to suffrage. For example, George 
Edmunds of Vermont noted that while enfranchising blacks, the 
57. R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 216-19 (1977). 
58. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
59. /d. 
60. ld. at 2766. 
61. The importance of the concept of citizenship in the development of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment is also discussed at length in E. MALTZ, CiviL 
RIGHTS, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND CoNGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990). 
62. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1008 (1869). 
63. ld. at 938. 
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Howard proposal left "the native of every other country under the 
sun, the descendant of every race under the sun, entirely to the 
mercy of the States." He asserted that "it is little less than an out-
rage upon the patriotism and good sense of a country like this, 
made up of the descendants of all nations, to impose upon them an 
amendment of that kind."64 Addressing a different proposal, 
Lyman Trumbull took a similar view, contending that when en-
franchising blacks, it seemed "paradoxical" to exclude the Chinese, 
"citizens of the oldest empire of the earth."6s Ultimately, the Ed-
munds/Trumbull position prevailed. 
The result was quite different when radical Charles Sumner of 
Massachusetts proposed a change in language which would have 
prohibited all racial discrimination in voting rights, rather than 
simply discrimination among citizens.66 The proposal would have 
had little impact on the rights of blacks, almost all of whom had 
been granted citizenship by section one of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Most Chinese, however, were immigrants and ineligible to 
become citizens under federal naturalization law. Thus the Sumner 
proposal had a potentially profound effect on their rights. At the 
very least, they would have become enfranchised in states such as 
Michigan and Indiana, which did not condition the suffrage on citi-
zenship.67 Some senators worried that the proposal would require 
the enfranchisement of all Chinese, even in those states which had 
heretofore allowed only citizens to vote. 68 
This possibility caused great consternation among Republican 
senators. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey asserted that 
"I feel that he [sic] should not introduce into this country hordes of 
pagans and heathen. I think we are under every obligation to give 
our own people equal, unrestricted rights. I do not feel that obliga-
tion toward the people of Asia. "69 Oliver Morton of Indiana, 10 who 
had also strongly opposed the Howard formulation, attacked the 
Sumner proposal and argued that Chinese should not be given ac-
cess to naturalization; he contended that if granted the right to vote, 
"[t]hey will some time come to understand their power, and when 
they are in the majority will rise up and seize it ... there ought to be 
some provisions made against a catastrophe of that kind."11 
64. /d. at 1009. 
65. /d. at 1036. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. at 1030 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). 
68. /d. at 1033 (remarks of Sen. Morton). 
69. /d. at 1034. 
70. /d. at 1308. 
71. /d. at 1034. 
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Stunned by the intensity of the reaction to his proposal, Sumner 
simply withdrew it without a vote. n 
These discussions reflect once again the importance of citizen-
ship in the Republican world-view. Republicans were not only will-
ing to allow states to restrict the right to vote to citizens generally; 
states were deliberately left free to discriminate on the basis of race 
among noncitizens. Such action is hardly consistent with the view 
of those who argue that Reconstruction-era Republicans were un-
concerned with the concept of citizenship. 
The relationship between citizenship and property rights was 
reaffirmed by implication in 1870. Spurred by the mistreatment of 
Chinese immigrants in California, in that year Congress adopted a 
provision-patterned on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866---which 
granted aliens the same status as "white citizens" with respect to 
certain specified rights. 73 Repeatedly, Senator William Stewart of 
Nevada, the sponsor of the provision, asserted that the proposal 
would guarantee to aliens their fourteenth amendment right to 
equal protection. 74 Yet the 1870 proposal was actually less sweep-
ing than the 1866 bill, leaving aliens without a federally protected 
right to buy, sell, and hold real property. The implicit message was 
clear: the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to per-
sons generally were viewed as less sweeping than those guaranteed 
to citizens. 1s 
In short, the historical background of the Reconstruction 
amendments is clearly inconsistent with a general rule that subjects 
classifications based on alienage to close judicial scrutiny. The 
framers clearly believed that aliens were entitled to some rights; at 
the same time, however, they carefully noted and preserved the dis-
tinction between aliens and citizens. Thus, their theory of equality 
cannot have encompassed a general belief that the concept of citi-
zenship should be viewed as irrelevant to state action. 
The framers' treatment of aliens calls into serious question the 
entire idea that their theory of equality was group-based. On one 
hand, the framers explicitly guaranteed to aliens a certain set of 
rights; on the other, they refused to grant other rights to aliens and 
deliberately structured the fourteenth amendment to discriminate 
between aliens and citizens. Such a pattern would be inexplicable 
under a group-based theory of equality. 
72. /d. at 1035. 
73. Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1869-71). 
74. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 323, 1536, 1678, 3658 (1870). See Runyon v. 
McCreary, 427 U.S. 160, 198-200 (1976). 
75. See CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1879) (colloquy between Sen. Pome-
roy and Sen. Stewart). 
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The pattern fits far more comfortably with what I have de-
scribed elsewhere as the theory of "limited absolute equality" -the 
idea that all men were equally entitled to a certain quantum of 
rights, and that all citizens were equally entitled to a somewhat 
greater quantum of rights.76 Under this theory, the problem with 
the degraded status of free blacks was not that racial discrimination 
per se was bad, but rather that they were being denied rights which 
no man (and later citizen) could be denied for any reason. The 
choice to use the rights of whites as a touchstone in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and 1870 was merely a matter of convenience and fed-
eralism. 11 The basic problem remained, in the words of one promi-
nent antebellum Republican, "a question of manhood, not race. "78 
Republican treatment of aliens in the early Reconstruction era 
reflects just such a theory. The fourteenth amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870 guarantee the natural rights of aliens; by con-
trast, both Civil Rights Acts and the fifteenth amendment withhold 
from aliens protection for rights that Republicans viewed as closely 
tied to citizenship. The theory of limited absolute equality best ex-
plains this pattern of treatment. 
If in fact the framers were committed to the concept of limited 
absolute equality, commentators who seek to tie constitutional anal-
ysis to the framers' general theory of equality must take a different 
tack. Rather than concentrating on the characteristics that entitle 
groups to special protection, the commentators must focus their at-
tention on the rights that the framers believed belonged to all citi-
zens. Determining the extent of these rights is beyond the scope of 
this article; what is clear, however, is that generalized protection 
from discrimination for groups such as women and illegitimates is 
not within the scope of the framers' general theory. Thus, an effort 
to faithfully implement that theory would drastically reorient mod-
em constitutional jurisprudence. 
Even a reorientation, however, would not fully reflect the fram-
ers' basic worldview. A theory of equality was not the only idea 
that influenced the drafting of the fourteenth amendment; the draft-
ers were constrained by other basic concepts as well. The contem-
porary discussions of sex discrimination bring this point into sharp 
relief. 
76. See Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in 
the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221, 224-25 (1987). 
77. /d. at 256-57. 
78. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 290 (1970). 
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III 
The legal position of women in the nineteenth century reflected 
the widely-shared belief that women were in many ways less compe-
tent than men to participate in public affairs. Those defending this 
belief relied on two related but different types of argument. Some 
claimed that women were generally inferior to men: 
How did woman first become subject to man, as she now is all over the world? 
By her nature, her sex, just as the negro is and always will be, to the end of time, 
inferior to the white race, and therefore doomed to subjection; but happier than she 
would be in any other condition, just because it is the law of her nature. 79 
Others relied on the theory of "separate spheres," the idea that 
while men were naturally dominant in public life, women were bet-
ter suited to provide an appropriate atmosphere for family life 
Woman was created to be a wife and mother; that is her destiny. To that 
destiny all her instincts point, and for it nature has specially qualified her. Her 
proper sphere is home, and her proper function is the case of the household, to 
manage a family, to take care of children, and to attend to their early training. For 
that she is endowed with patience, endurance, passive courage, quick sensibilities, a 
sympathetic nature, and great executive and administrative ability. She was born to 
be a queen in her own household, and to make home cheerful, bright, and happy. 80 
Women were generally denied direct political power, and the eco-
nomic rights of married women in particular were often sharply 
limited. 
By 1866, however, many sex-based restrictions were under at-
tack from the growing feminist movement of the period.st Not sur-
prisingly, many Republicans were sympathetic to at least some of 
the goals of feminism. The Republican party was the most impor-
tant mainstream progressive political movement of the era; more-
over, in the antebellum era feminism had been closely tied to the 
abolitionist movement, which in turn had close ties to the radical 
wing of the party.s2 Republican support for improvement of the 
legal position of women was therefore to be expected. 
Not surprisingly, members of the radical wing of the party 
often supported feminist aspirations (albeit not unanimously).s3 In 
79. Editorial, N.Y. Herald, September 12, 1852, in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SE-
LECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 190 (A. Kraditor ed. 1968). 
80. Orestes A. Brownson, The Woman Question, in id. at 193. 
81. Eg., M. GURKE, THE LADIES OF SENECA FALLS: THE BIRTH OF THE WOMAN'S 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1974). 
82. See, e.g., M. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, THE CoNCISE HISTORY OF WoMAN SUFFRAGE: 
SELECTIONS FROM THE CLASSIC WORK OF STANTON, ANTHONY, GAGE & HARPER ch. 2 
(1978). 
83. See, e.g., Letter from W.G. S. To The Right Way, in National Anti-Slavery Stan-
dard, April28, 1866, at 3, col. 4; H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S 
VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 26-28 (1969). 
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addition, however, the cause of women's rights at times also found 
support from members of other Republican factions. An example 
of this support came from a contributor to The Nation, a centrist 
Republican journal. Mter analogizing the legal status of women to 
that of slaves in the antebellum South, the author continued: 
The ... traditions, which reduce woman to the condition of an inferior caste, 
are in conflict with the whole tone and purport of American institutions. They 
constitute what lawyers call a "discrepancy," an irreconcilable discord, in our 
whole social life. Let us begin with recognizing true and liberal principles, and trust 
to the logic of society to work out legitimate and beneficent results. Let us not 
dispute whether women shall, if special vocation call them, walk in hitherto untrod-
den paths, or shall be confined to such rude "small chores" as lofty manhood scorns 
to stoop to; Jet us not, like the bee, feed one human larva to be a worker, one a 
mother, and another a drone; but let us administer to both sexes, in every condition 
of life, that generous intellectual, moral and physical nutrimaent [sic] which will 
enable each to develop most perfectly the powers and facilities of the material and 
moral organization. 84 
By 1872, Republican support for the women's rights movement was 
sufficiently strong that the party platform explicitly recognized the 
feminist movement.ss 
For a variety of reasons, however, support for women's rights 
was not translated into federal action during the Reconstruction 
era. First, some prominent Republicans continued to believe that 
the law should be adapted to the "natural" differences between men 
and women. For example, addressing the issue of women's suffrage, 
Republican Senator Lot Morrill embraced the concept of separate 
spheres. Morrill argued that granting women the right to vote: 
Associates the wife and mother with policies of state, with making, interpreting, 
and executing the laws, with police and war, and necessarily disservates her from 
purely domestic affairs, peculiar care and duties of the family; and, worst of all, 
assigns her duties revolting to her nature and constitution, and wholly incompatible 
with those which spring from womanhood. 86 
In addition, other factors limited Republicans' willingness to 
take federal action to alleviate the condition of women. One of the 
most important of these factors was the continuing influence of the 
ideology of federalism on Republican thought. Condemnations of 
the idea of centralized federal authority reverberated throughout 
the Reconstruction debate. For example, even arch-radical Wen-
dell Phillips declared "I love State Rights; that doctrine is the cor-
nerstone of individual liberty."s1 Less radical elements of the 
Republican party were even more concerned with the problem of 
84. THE NATION, July 8, 1866, at 166. 
85. ) D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 47 (1978). 
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 2d Sess. 40 (1866). 
87. National Anti-Slavery Standard, May 15, 1865, at 2, col. 2. 
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centralization. Thus, The Nation described the "Lessons of War" in 
the following terms: 
[O]ur institutions of local freedom are but so many roots to feed and strengthen our 
common nationality . . . a nation thus vitalized . . . cannot be compressed into a 
centralized power even under the stupendous weight of war. [The watchword is] 
sovereignty without centralization ... gg 
In opposing a proposal for federal action to prevent the spread of 
cholera the following year, the influential Senator James W. Grimes 
of Iowa was even more explicit: 
During the prevalence of the [Civil War] we drew to ourselves here as the Federal 
Government authority which had been considered doubtful by all and denied by 
many of the statesmen of this country. That time, it seems to me, has ceased and 
ought to cease. Let us go back to the original condition of things, and allow the 
States to take care of themselves as they have been in the habit of taking care of 
themselves. 89 
Concerns such as these had a strong influence on the form and 
scope of Congressional action on civil rights. For example, an early 
draft of section one of the fourteenth amendment was rejected 
because of fears that it would vest too much authority in the federal 
govemment.90 Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was modified 
to ensure that it would not cut an unduly broad swath through 
areas that were hitherto exclusively under state contro1.9I 
Of course, during the Reconstruction era, some problems were 
so critical to Republicans that they extended federal control over 
previously untouchable areas of state authority. The legal status of 
blacks is the most obvious example. Equal rights for women did 
not, however, have the same urgency for most Republicans. As 
Eric Foner has noted, "[a] Civil War had not been fought over the 
status of women, nor had thirty years of prior agitation awakened 
public consciousness on the issue. "92 From a Republican perspec-
tive, aggressive advocacy of federal protection for the rights of 
88. THE NATION, July 13, 1865, at 39. 
89. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2446. See also, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Novem-
ber 10, 1866, at 706; Open Letter from Carl Schurz to William Fessenden, Cincinnati Com-
mercial, May 18, 1866, at 2; Springfield Republican, AprilS, 1866, at 4; H. HYMAN, A MoRE 
PERFECT UNION 300-01, 393-96 (1973). 
90. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Hale); id. 
at 1095 (remarks of Rep. Hotchkiss); id. at 1082 (remarks of Sen. Stewart); id. at 1083, 1087 
(remarks of Rep. Davis); id. at 1095 (by implication) (remarks of Rep. Conkling); Springfield 
Republican, Mar. 2, 1866, at 2; Chicago Tribune, Mar. 1, 1866, at 1, col. 3; Maltz, supra note 
41, at 267-75. 
91. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366-67 (1866) (remarks of Rep. 
Wilson); Maltz, supra note 41, at 253-58. 
92. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 
255 (1988); see a/so, W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLmCAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DocTRINE 136-39 (1988). 
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women could only divert attention from the mere pressing problems 
of freedmen's rights and dilute support for already-controversial 
measures designed to protect those rights. 
The radical National Anti-Slavery Standard aptly described the 
prevailing political situation. While noting that women's rights was 
. a "good cause," an editorial in the Standard also asserted that: 
(W]e cannot agree that the enfranchisement of women and enfranchisement of 
blacks stand on the same ground at this moment. Thirty years of agitation and four 
years of war have created this costly opportunity [for blacks]. If we let it pass, it 
passes forever, or at any rate for a generation. . . . Causes have their crises. That of 
the negro has come; that of the women's rights movement has not come.93 
Despite this dynamic, Congressional debates on Reconstruc-
tion measures did include significant (albeit sporadic) discussions of 
the rights of women. The discussions focused on three important 
issues-the economic rights of married women, women's suffrage, 
and the right of women to serve on juries. 
During the antebellum era, married women had made signifi-
cant progress toward gaining control of their economic affairs. At 
common law, the rule had been that "the husband and wife are one 
person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated 
into that of the husband."94 Under this principle, the woman could 
not contract except for "necessaries" and as her husband's agent; 
could not sue or be sued in her own name; and could neither make a 
will nor alienate realty except with her husband's consent.9s Dur-
ing the nineteenth century the rigors of this regime began to be 
eased through a variety of devices. The movement toward greater 
economic independence was, however, far from complete by the end 
of the Civil War.96 Moreover, considerations of federalism limited 
agitation on the subject to the state level. 
Not surprisingly, claims that civil rights initiatives would abro-
gate state authority over women's property rights were used to at-
tack early Reconstruction initiatives. For example, Senator Edgar 
Cowan of Pennsylvania-a nominal Republican who consistently 
93. National Anti-Slavery Standard, December 30, 1865, at 2, col. 3. 
94. W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW *442 (1941); see 
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270 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:251 
opposed his party's program on civil rights-brought up the point 
in his critique of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. Claiming that the 
language of the Bill guaranteed all native-born citizens "the same 
right [to contract] in every State and Territory of the United 
States," Cowan continued: 
Now, a married woman in no State that I know of has a right to make contracts 
generally. In some of the States she cannot contract at all; in others she contracts 
sub modo; and in all there is a limit put upon her power to contract. Is it intended 
by this bill that it shall be put in the hands of any judge to decide that this bill 
confers upon married women the unlimited right to contract?. . . Now I ask Sena-
tors having the care of States here, whether they are willing to put it in the power of 
the district court of the United States, or the circuit court of the United States, or 
any other court de hoT"$ the State to interfere with regard to the contracts of married 
women?97 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois-the author of the Civil Rights 
Bill-emphatically denied any such intention.9s Further the sup-
porters of the Bill consistently maintained that it was aimed only at 
racial discrimination. This claim derives strong support from the 
language of the Bill itself, which guaranteed to all citizens only "the 
same right to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white 
citizens."99 Since the rights of female white citizens were restricted 
by state law, Trumbull's bill would not have any effect on women's 
rights generally. 
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio-the author of sec-
tion one of the fourteenth amendment-also encountered problems 
with the issue of sex discrimination. Initially, Bingham introduced 
a proposal for a constitutional amendment that would simply have 
armed Congress with the power to secure to citizens all "privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several States" and to persons 
"equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property." Con-
servative Republican RobertS. Hale of New York used the example 
of married women's property rights to launch a federalism-based 
attack on the proposal: 
Take the case of married women; did any one ever assume that Congress was to be 
invested with the power to legislate on that subject, and to say that married women, 
in regard to their rights of property, should stand on the same footing with men and 
unmarried women? There is not a State in the Union where disability of married 
women in relation to the rights of property does not exist to a greater or lesser 
extent.IOO 
As has often been noted, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania 
97. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1781-82 (1866). 
98. /d. at 1782. 
99. This language was deliberately added by the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives. See id. at IllS. 
100. /d. at 1064. 
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responded that"[w]hen a distinction is made between two married 
people or two femmes soles, that is unequal legislation; but where all 
of the same class are dealt with in the same way there is no pretense 
ofinequality."tot Hale, however, refused to accept this explanation: 
[I]f [the language of the proposal] means you shall extend to one married woman 
the same protection you extend to another, and not the same you extend to unmar-
ried women and men, then by parity of reasoning it will be sufficient if you extend to 
one negro the same rights you do to another, but not those you extend to a white 
man.l02 
Bingham's response to Hale on this issu~elivered the next 
day-is less often considered:to3 
[Representative Hale says] if you adopt this amendment you give to Congress the 
power to enforce all the rights of married women in the several States. . . . He need 
not be alarmed at the condition of married women. Those rights which are univer-
sal and independent of all local State legislation belong, by the gift of God, to every 
woman, whether married or single. The rights of life and liberty are theirs whatever 
States may enact. But the gentleman's concern is as to the right of property in 
married women. 
Although this word property has been in your Bill of Rights from the year 
1789 until this hour, who ever heard it intimated that anybody could have property 
protected in any state until he owned or acquired property there according to its 
local law or according to the law of some other State which he may have carried 
thither? I undertake to say no one. 
As to real estate, everyone knows that its acquisition and transmission under 
every interpretation ever given to the word property as used in the Constitution of 
the country are dependent exclusively upon the local law of the State, save under a 
direct grant of the United States. But suppose any person has acquired property not 
contrary to the laws of the State but in accordance with its law, are they not to be 
equally protected in the enjoyment of it, or are they to be denied all protection? 
That is the question, and the whole question, so far as that part of the case is 
concemed.104 
Bingham's analysis links two different concepts that figured 
prominently in the debates of the Reconstruction era. The first is 
the distinction between natural rights and rights derived from citi-
zenship. Rights to life and liberty-freedom from physical re-
strainttos-were clearly in the former category. The absolute right 
to real property, by contrast, derived from citizenship; thus, the 
rights of aliens in this regard were often restricted by the states.t06 
101. /d. 
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69 HARv. L. REV. I, 38 (1955) (considering Bingham's response on other points); Note, Sex 
Discrimination and the 14th Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1988). 
104. /d. at 1089. 
105. See J. KENT, supra note 94, at *26. 
106. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866); CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1536 (1870); J. KENT, supra note 94, at *53-64. 
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Bingham connects this distinction with an appeal to principles 
of federalism. He seems to suggest that since the rights to life and 
liberty are natural rights, states may not distinguish between sexes 
with respect to those rights. By contrast, since the right to own and 
convey real property is derived from citizenship, Bingham indicates 
that even under his proposal Congress would have no authority to 
overturn state judgments in these areas. 
Taken alone, Bingham's argument is not a complete response 
to Hale's contentions. First, even on its own terms Bingham's anal-
ysis does not support state autonomy with respect to the right to 
contract..........one area in which many states had limited the power of 
married women.101 That right seems to have been considered a nat-
ural right rather than one derived from citizenship. lOs Thus, if one 
focused only on the natural right/citizenship right dichotomy, 
under Bingham's proposal the federal government would have 
gained authority to override state law on this issue. 
Moreover, even with respect to real property, the appeal to 
principles of federalism was not an entirely satisfactory response to 
Hale. After all, the same argument might be made in connection 
with state laws that prohibited ownership of property by blacks-
laws that Bingham plainly wished to arm Congress with authority 
to abrogate. Thus Bingham's position is only plausible if he viewed 
his proposal as incorporating the antebellum position on sex dis-
crimination-that although women were citizens, they nonetheless 
could appropriately be subjected to disabilities that would have 
been unacceptable if imposed on men. 
Similarly, under the post-War Republican ideology, women 
could be placed under restrictions that could not be applied to 
blacks generally. Representative William Lawrence of Ohio sum-
marized this position in his defense of the Civil Rights Bill: "dis-
tinctions created by nature of sex . . . are recognized as modifying 
[privileges and immunities of citizenship], but mere race or color, as 
among citizens, never can."I09 Representative Samuel Shel-
labarger-also from Ohio-took a similar position. In his defense 
of the constitutionality of the Bill, Shellabarger distinguished 
sharply between federal power over the rights of women and federal 
power to outlaw state-imposed racial discrimination: 
If [the Bill] undertook, for example, to say that a married woman [was entitled to 
particular rights], that would invade the rights reserved to the States. But, sir, it 
107. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1781-82 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan). 
108. See CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (text of Civil Rights Act of 
1870) (by implication) (protecting right of aliens to contract). 
109. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835 (1866). 
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does nothing like that. It permits the States to say that the wife may not testify, sue, 
or contract. It makes no law as to this. Its whole effect is to require that whatever 
rights as to each of these enumerated civil ... matters the States may confer upon 
one race or color of the citizens shall be held by all races equally. Your State may 
deprive women of the right to sue or contract or testify. . . . But if you do so, or not 
do so as to one race, you shall treat the other likewise. 110 
In any event, one point emerges clearly from the discussions. 
Neither supporters nor opponents of civil rights proposals wished to 
arm the federal government with power to change the economic 
rights of women. However, the relatively sparse debates did not 
provide a complete picture of the justification for the Republican 
position. Discussions of the suffrage issue, by contrast, produced a 
much fuller view of the competing arguments. 
The suffrage issue was a central focus of the nineteenth century 
feminist movement. Feminists made concerted but ultimately fruit-
less attempts to obtain the vote for women in states such as New 
York, Wisconsin and Kansas; their earliest successes came in the 
Wyoming territory in 1869 and the Utah territory in 1870. They 
also continually pressed for a federal enactment that would guaran-
tee women the right to vote nationwide.ttt In the Reconstruction 
era, Congress was presented with a variety of petitions to take the 
necessary action.112 The Republican party split over the appropri-
ate response to these petitions. 
The pronouncements of important Republican journals pro-
vided evidence of this split. The National Anti-Slavery Standard 
consistently supported the basic feminist position on voting 
rights; m The Nation also endorsed the principle of women's suf-
frage.u4 By contrast, the conservative New York Times evinced 
much less enthusiasm for granting women the right to vote.m 
Republican legislators were similarly divided on the issue. In 
the 40th Congress, Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas and Rep-
resentative George V. Julian of Indiana each introduced legislation 
that would have forbidden discrimination on the basis of sex in 
I 10. !d. at 1293. 
Ill. A concise overview of the development of the women's suffrage movement can be 
found in M. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, supra note 82, at 1-49. 
112. E.g., Resolutions of Equal Rights Meeting, Boston, Mass., May 31, 1866 quoted in, 
National Anti-Slavery Standard, June 23, 1866, at 3, col. I; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 951-52 (1866); Address to Congress, adopted by the Eleventh National Women's Rights 
Convention, May 10, 1866, in M. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, supra note 82, at 226-29; Memorial 
and Petition of Victoria Woodhull to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, 
in id. at 283-87. 
113. See, e.g., National Anti-Slavery Standard, April4, 1866, at 2, col. 3; February 16, 
1867, at 2, col. 2; March 23, 1867, at 2, col. 3; July 6, 1867, at 2, col. 2-3. 
114. The Nation, vol. 3, at 498-99 (1866). 
115. N.Y. Times, December 13, 1866, at 4, col. 4. 
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voter qualifications.tt6 Senators such as Henry B. Anthony of 
Rhode Island,ll7 Benjamin Wade ofOhio,ns and Edmund G. Ross 
of Kansasn9 and Representatives such as Benjamin F. Butler of 
Massachusettst2o also supported the right of women to vote. On the 
other hand, Senators such as Lot Morrill of Mainel21 and George 
H. Williams of Oregon122 expressed opposition. 
The issue posed particularly acute difficulties for those Repub-
licans who took the view that suffrage was either a natural right or a 
necessary concomitant of citizenship. Obviously, women were citi-
zens; how, then, could they be denied the right to vote? Represen-
tative John Broomall of Pennsylvania attempted to solve the 
problem through the theory of "virtual representation." He argued 
that women, like children, are "under the legal control of others," 
and that their interests were represented indirectly by their adult 
male husbands and fathers.12J This theory had obvious ftaws, 124 
and those who argued that suffrage was simply a conventional right 
continued to use the example of the status of women as evidence in 
support of their position. m 
But even among supporters of the feminist position, simple 
belief in women's suffrage was insufficient to guarantee support for 
congressional action. Considerations of federalism were particu-
larly important in the voting rights context. At the beginning of the 
Reconstruction era, most Republicans believed that states should 
retain full control over voting qualifications. Ultimately, as the fif-
teenth amendment demonstrates, they reluctantly modified this po-
sition to forbid racial discrimination. The political exigencies that 
generated this narrowly-focused change in position were particu-
larly strong; no such exigencies existed in the context of the struggle 
of women for the right to vote. The result was that the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses took no action on this issue. 
Congressional Republicans were rarely put to the test on the 
female suffrage question. Racial discrimination was the central civil 
rights issue of the era, and Republicans were understandably preoc-
116. SeeM. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, supra note 82, at 281. 
117. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1866). 
118. /d. at 63. 
119. Letter to the Voters of Kansas, National Anti-Slavery Standard, July 12, 1867, at 1 
col. 3. 
120. See H.R. Rep. No. 22, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1871). 
121. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866). 
122. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 901 (1869). 
123. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (1868). See a/so CoNG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Poland) (same argument). 
124. See J. BAER, supra note 32, at 91-92. 
125. See, e.g., sources cited at nn.l36-37, infra. 
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cupied with the question of black suffrage. However, on one critical 
suffrage-related issue--changing the basis of representation for the 
House of Representatives-Congress took action that infuriated 
supporters of women's rights. Section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides that "when the right to vote . . . is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of [a] state [meeting certain qualifications], the 
basis of representation [in the House of Representatives] shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State." Women's rights advocates charged that this 
provision implicitly recognized the justice of denying women the 
right to vote.t26 
The Congressional debates concerning section 2 seemed to con-
firm this view. Acting as official spokesman for the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan argued 
that the denial of the right to vote to blacks as a class was inconsis-
tent with Madison's concept of a republican form of government.t27 
Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland asked whether 
the same principle might apply to the issue of women's suffrage.t2s 
Howard responded: 
I believe that Mr. Madison was old enough and wise enough to take it for granted 
there was such a thing as the law of nature which has a certain inlluence in political 
affairs, and that by that law women ... were not regarded as the equals of men. 
Mr. Madison would not have quibbled about the question of women's 
voting .... 129 
Advocates of women's suffrage were understandably chagrined 
by the expression of sentiments such as these. Commenting on ear-
lier proposals that were similar to section 2, the radical New York 
Independent summarized the feminist complaint: 
The spider-crab walks backward. Borrowing this creature's mossy legs, [some 
Republicans] are working to fix these upon the Federal Constitution, to make that 
instrument walk backward in like style. For instance, the Constitution has never 
laid any legal disabilities upon women. 
[Proposals such as section 2] array the fundamental law of the land against the 
multitude of American women by ordaining a denial of the political rights of a 
whole sex. To this injustice we object totally! Such an amendment is a snap judg-
ment before discussion; it is an obstacle to future progress; it is a gratuitous bruise 
infticted upon the most tender and humane sentiment that has entered into Ameri-
can politics. If the present Congress is not called to legislate for the rights of wo-
126. M. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, supra note 82, at 226-29. 
127. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866). 
128. /d. 
129. /d. 
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men, let it not legislate against them.l30 
The choice of language for section 2 was not in fact intended to 
be a direct attack on the concept of women's suffrage. The adjust-
ment to the basis of representation was an essential part of the com-
promise Reconstruction plan embodied in the fourteenth 
amendment as a whole. The problem was one that concerned all 
Republicans. Prior to the adoption of the thirteenth amendment, 
each slave was counted as only three-fifths of a person for purposes 
of determining a state's representation in the House of Representa-
tives. When the thirteenth amendment abolished slavery, each of 
the freed slaves perforce counted as a full person. In the absence of 
some further Constitutional alteration, this change threatened to 
greatly increase the political power of the overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic white voters of the erstwhile slave states. 
One possible solution to this problem might have been to en-
franchise the freed slaves, who would presumably support the Re-
publican party. In 1866, however, more conservative mainstream 
Republicans were unwilling to take such a step. Alternatively, Con-
gress might have reduced the basis of representation only of those 
states that imposed racial qualifications on suffrage. Such a propo-
sal actually passed the House of Representatives in 1866; it was de-
feated in the Senate, however, having been opposed by some radical 
Republicans who viewed it as implicitly sanctioning state refusals to 
enfranchise blacks.IJI 
Other race-blind, sex-blind language had been proposed to deal 
with the problem. The difficulty was that any language that re-
duced the basis of representation for states that did not allow wo-
men to vote would reallocate representatives between loyal states-
from states that had a high percentage of women in the population 
(generally located in the Northeast) to those states whose popula-
tion was dominated by men (generally located in the West). Obvi-
ously, the Republican representatives from those states which 
would lose in such a process were not happy with this prospect.m 
Only by choosing language such as that ultimately adopted could 
this difficulty be avoided.m 
In short, section 2 was more a product of indifference to the 
women's rights movement than of active hostility. The vote on the 
130. M. BUHLE & P. BUHLE, supra note 82, at 226-29. 
131. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1227 (remarks of Sen. Sumner). 
132. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Conkling). 
133. For detailed accounts of the debate over the earlier representation proposal, seeM. 
BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECON-
STRUCTION, 1863-1869 152-61 (1974); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 68-74 (1956). 
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proposal should not be taken as a referendum on women's suffrage. 
The most important direct discussion of the issue came in the de-
bate over the District of Columbia suffrage bill, the first major black 
suffrage bill of the Reconstruction era. It is thus not surprising that 
Republicans chose the District for their initial assault on the black 
suffrage problem. All agreed that Congress had plenary authority 
over the affairs of the nation's capitol. Therefore, unlike attempts to 
impose black suffrage on the states, analogous Congressional efforts 
to change voting requirements in the District did not raise federal-
ism-related concerns. 
The House of Representatives considered a bill providing for 
race-blind suffrage in the District in January, 1866. The most radi-
cal supporters of the bill claimed that the right to vote was a natural 
right,J34 and that universal manhood suffrage was a prerequisite to a 
republican form of government. m Attacking the entire concept of 
black suffrage, Democrat Benjamin M. Boyer declared: 
If the negro has a natural right to vote because he is a human inhabitant of a com-
munity professing to be republican, then women should vote, for the same reason; 
and the New England States themselves are only pretended republics, because their 
women, who are in a considerable majority, are denied the right to suft'rage.l36 
Seeking to limit the scope of black suffrage, conservative Republi-
can John A. Kasson of Iowa took a similar tack: 
[I]n the history of this country we have excluded certain classes generally from 
taking part in the election ... we have excluded women of all ages irrespective of 
intelligence or tax paying.137 
Despite the comments of Boyer and Kasson, the question of 
women's suffrage did not play a major role in the House debates on 
the District of Columbia bill. When the Senate took up the bill in 
December, however, the issue of sex qualifications was much more 
fully discussed. In an attempt to embarrass the supporters of the 
bill, Edgar Cowan proposed an amendment that would have ex-
tended the suffrage to women.JJs The proposal elicited an extended 
debate. 
Republicans Henry B. Anthony of Rhode Island,l39 B. Gratz 
Brown of Missouri,J40 and Benjamin Wade of OhioJ41 expressed 
134. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1866) (remarks of Rep. 
Farnsworth). 
135. See, e.g., id. at 182-83 (remarks of Rep. Kelley). 
136. /d. at 177. 
137. /d. at 237. 
138. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1866). 
139. /d. at 55-56. 
140. /d. at 76-78. 
141. /d. at 62-63, 65. 
278 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:251 
support for the Cowan amendment. They spoke, however, for only 
a small minority even within their own party. Other Republicans 
gave a variety of reasons for opposing the women's suffrage 
proposal. 
Some spoke frankly in terms of expediency. They worried that 
attaching the Cowan amendment to the suffrage bill would result in 
its defeat and the loss of black suffrage in the District as well. The 
statement of Henry Wilson of Massachusetts is typical in this 
regard: 
I am for enfranchising the black man, and if [the woman's suffrage] question shall 
come up in due time and I have a vote I shall give my vote for it. But to vote for it 
now is to couple it with the great measure now pressing upon us, to weaken that 
measure and to endanger its immediate triumph, and therefore I shall vote against 
the [Cowan amendment].l42 
These concerns were coupled with the view that women had 
much less need of suffrage than blacks. Adopting the virtual repre-
sentation analysis, Frederick T. Freylinghuysen of New Jersey 
argued 
[T]he women of America vote by faithful and true representatives, their husbands, 
their brothers, their sons; and no true man will go to the polls and deposit his ballot 
without remembering the true and loving constituency that he has at home 
In [this regard] there is a vast difference between the situation of the colored 
citizen and the women of America. 
Freylinghuysen continued with a more basic attack on the the-
ory of women's suffrage 
[T]he women of America are not called upon to serve the government as the men of 
America are. They do not bear the bayonet, and have not that reason why they 
should be entitled to the ballot; and it seems to me as if the God of our race has 
stamped upon them a milder, gentler nature, which not only makes them shrink 
from, but disqualifies them for the turmoil and battle of public life.l43 
This argument captured the essence of the ideological justifica-
tion for limitation of voting rights to men. Women may have been 
considered citizens, but they were members of a different class of 
citizen than men-a class with both fewer rights and fewer obliga-
tions to society. As such, they were not entitled to exercise the 
franchise. 
Ultimately, the women's suffrage amendment was soundly de-
feated. It garnered only nine votes, with four of those coming from 
Cowan and his allies in an effort to undermine the entire suffrage 
142. /d. at 63-64 (remarks of Sen. Yates), 84 (remarks of Sen. Pomeroy). 
143. /d. at 65-66. See also id. at 40 (remarks of Sen. Morrill); id. at 56-57 (remarks of 
Sen. Williams). 
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bill.l44 Thus the Republican party overwhelmingly refused to com-
mit itself to the principle of sex-blind suffrage. 
Despite the result of the District of Columbia suffrage vote, the 
issue of women's suffrage did not completely disappear from the 
deliberations of the Reconstruction Congresses. The possibility of 
extending suffrage to women was mentioned a number of times dur-
ing the debates over the fifteenth amendment; 14s no vote was taken 
on any proposal aimed at enfranchising women, however.l46 In ad-
dition, suffrage advocates repeatedly petitioned Congress to en-
franchise women by federal action. Some argued for a 
constitutional amendment; others contended that the newly-ratified 
fourteenth amendment gave Congress the necessary authority. The 
latter position was the focus of an 1871 "memorial" to the House of 
Representatives from Victoria C. Woodhull and a similar 1872 me-
morial to the Senate from a group of prominent feminists including 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. 
These memorials were rejected by the respective Judiciary 
Committees of both Houses. The House Judiciary report was pre-
pared by John A. Bingham of Ohio-the author of section 1 of the 
fourteenth amendment;'•' the Senate report was the work of Mat-
thew W. Carpenter.1•s Both the Bingham and Carpenter reports 
focused on issues of federalism. They first noted that the original 
Constitution had left the matter of qualifications for voting entirely 
with the states.l49 Turning to the impact of the fourteenth amend-
ment, both Bingham and Carpenter argued that section 2 of the 
amendment implicitly recognized the continued authority of the 
144. ld. at 84. 
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states over voter qualifications.lso They agreed that the right to 
vote was not one of the "privileges and immunities of citizenship" 
guaranteed by section 1 of the amendmentts•-a view that Bingham 
had also expressed during the debates over the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment in 1866.Is2 Thus, both reports concluded that 
Congress had no authority to legislate on the subject beyond that 
provided by section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, which dealt with 
racial discrimination only. Thus they avoided addressing directly 
the merits of the women's suffrage issue-an issue on which the 
Republican party remained divided.Is3 
To summarize, on the suffrage issue Congressional Republi-
cans consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to tamper with the 
traditional exclusion of women from the right to vote. On a number 
of occasions they were presented with opportunities to embrace the 
cause of women's suffrage; in each case, they declined the invitation. 
The Congressional discussions of the exclusion of women from 
juries followed the pattern of earlier discussions of women's prop-
erty rights rather than that of the suffrage debates. Republicans 
were never asked to vote directly on the question of whether women 
should be allowed to serve. Instead, the possibility that expansive 
constitutional theories might authorize Congress to place women on 
state juries was used as an argument against those theories. 
--..__ . 
One of the sharpest exchanges took place m 1872 between Sen-
ator Lot Morrill of Maine and Senator John Sherman of Ohio. 
Both Morrill and Sherman had voted for the fourteenth amendment 
in 1866; they differed, however, on the question of whether the en-
forcement clause of that amendment empowered Congress to re-
quire states to allow blacks to serve on juries. Sherman based his 
argument on the right of an accused to have members of his own 
class judge his guilt or innocence. Morrill challenged this proposi-
tion by suggesting that the same logic would justify a federal re-
quirement that women be allowed to serve as jurors. The following 
colloquy ensued: 
Mr. SHERMAN. In regard to the right of trial by jury as to women, it is a 
matter of municipal regulation. 
150. Bingham Report, supra note 147, at 3; Carpenter Report, supra note 148, at 3. 
151. Bingham Report, supra note 147, at 1·2; Carpenter Report, supra note 148, at 3-4. 
152. All member.; of the two judiciary committees that considered the su1frage petitions 
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conclusion. Only Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts and William Loughridge of Iowa-
neither of whom served in the 39th Congress--dissented from the Bingham report. See H.R. 
REP. No. 22, supra note 147, pt. 2. No Senator filed a dissent from the Carpenter report. 
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Mr. MORRILL. It is a matter of municipal regulation; but that raises the 
precise question ... can the Congress of the United States invade it? 
Mr. SHERMAN. So far as the mere equity of the question raised by [Morrill] 
is concerned, I have no point to make. I never could give any reason that was 
satisfactory to my own conscience why an intelligent, educated woman should be 
excluded from the jury box. 
Mr. MORRILL. But the question comes back whether the Congress of the 
United States may interfere ... undoubtedly my State could ... put [women] in the 
jury box; but it does not; and can [Congress] do it? 
Mr. SHERMAN. I am certain I would not. 
I do not wish to prolong my remarks by entering into a discussion of women's 
rights. I can only say that I never could give any good reason, satisfactory to my 
own conscience, why a woman should not be allowed to vote or why she should not 
be allowed to hold office, or have the right to sit upon a jury, except that I would 
not vote to give them these rights, because I do not think it is best for human 
society, organized as it is on the basis of the family, to introduce such disturbing 
elements into the family circle, which is even of higher obligation than the obliga-
tion of Government. I 54 
Sherman's response to Morrill is in many ways typical of the 
Republican approach to the problem of sex discrimination. In the 
Reconstruction era, most Republicans viewed the status of women 
as an almost irrelevant side issue and consistently denied any inten-
tion to diminish traditional state prerogatives over the subject. At 
the same time, a significant number recognized that their position 
on women's rights created some tension with the basic political phi-
losophy which justified federal intervention on behalf of the freed 
slaves. The solution to the dilemma was often to emphasize another 
widely-shared aspect of contemporary ideology-the belief that wo-
men were inherently different from men, and thus should be as-
signed a different role in economic and political affairs. 
More generally, the framers' treatment of the issue of sex dis-
crimination clearly demonstrates that equality was not the only 
value that influenced the drafting of the fourteenth amendment. 
The concept of limited absolute equality was clearly an important 
consideration; it was modified, however, to accommodate other im-
portant values. Any theory of constitutional interpretation that 
seeks to rely on the framers' general political/moral theory must 
take this point into account. 
In short, any attempt to construct a classification-based theory 
of equal protection jurisprudence based on the framers' theory of 
equality must inevitably fail. The framers' treatment of aliens dur-
ing the Reconstruction era demonstrates that their basic view of 
equality was not classification-based at all; moreover, their ap-
154. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 845 (1872). See a/so id. at 820-21, 827 (Re-
marks of Sen. Carpenter) (supporting Morrill position). 
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proach to issues of sex discrimination shows that this basic view was 
modified by other considerations such as a commitment to federal-
ism and a keen awareness of political reality. In short, the four-
teenth amendment does not encompass any pure theory of equality, 
let alone one which focuses on classification problems. 
Of course, this analysis does not demonstrate that contempo-
rary judicial activism against discrimination based on alienage or 
sex is objectively "wrong," or that the Court should not be even 
more aggressive in these areas, as many critics have suggested. It 
does, however, demonstrate that constitutional attacks on sex dis-
crimination are not defensible in terms of any conception of the in-
tent of the framers, be it broad or narrow. Instead, the Court's 
approach (and that of those commentators who urge the Court to 
go further) can only be justified by a purely nonoriginalist theory of 
constitutional interpretation. Iss 
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